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 Abstract: Cognitive reflection is recognized as an important skill, which is necessary for 
making advantageous decisions. Even though gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection test 
(CRT) appear to be robust across multiple studies, little research has examined the source of the 
gender gap in performance. As a preliminarily step, we performed a meta-analysis of studies 
conducted by our research group in recent years to investigate the size of gender differences in 
cognitive reflection. Then, in Study 1, we tested the invariance of the scale across genders. In Study 
2, we investigated the role of math anxiety, mathematical reasoning, and gender in CRT 
performance. The results attested the measurement equivalence of the Cognitive Reflection Test – 
Long (CRT- L), when administered to male and female students. Additionally, , the results of the 
mediation analysis showed an indirect effect of gender on CRT-L performance through 
mathematical reasoning and math anxiety. The direct effect of gender was no longer statistically 
significant after accounting for the other variables. The current findings suggest that cognitive 
reflection is affected by numerical skills and related feelings, such as math anxiety, which, in turn, 
explains the gender differences. 
 
Cognitive reflection is recognized as an important skill, which is necessary for making 
advantageous decisions. Even though gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection test (CRT) 
appear to be robust across multiple studies, little research has examined the source of the gender 
gap in performance. In Study 1, we tested the invariance of the scale across genders. In Study 2, we 
investigated the role of math anxiety, mathematical reasoning, and gender in CRT performance. The 
results attested the measurement equivalence of the Cognitive Reflection Test – Long (CRT- L), 
when administered to male and female students. Additionally, the results of the mediation analysis 
showed an indirect effect of gender on CRT-L performance through mathematical reasoning and 
math anxiety. The direct effect of gender was no longer statistically significant after accounting for 
the other variables. The current findings suggest that cognitive reflection is affected by numerical 
skills and related feelings. 
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Introduction 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a hugely popular measure of the 
tendency to avoid errors based on intuitive response tendencies, and to rely on careful deliberation. 
As an example, consider the following item: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total.  The bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball.  How much does the ball cost? ______ cents. Although the correct 
response is 5 cents, many participants give the response “10 cents”, which seems to pop into mind 
effortlessly. Indeed, a remarkable property of the CRT is that for each item, almost all participants 
produce either the normatively correct response, or a typical incorrect (i.e., heuristic) response. 
Cognitive reflection involves the ability to effectively monitor and correct impulsive response 
tendencies,  and it is related to a wide variety of cognitive and decision-making skills (e.g., Cokely 
& Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Koehler & James, 2010; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009; 
Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011; 2014), as well as thinking dispositions (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & 
Sloman, 2013; Fernbach, Sloman, Louis, & Shube, 2013; Mata, Fiedler, Ferreira, & Almeida, 2013; 
Pennycook, Cheyne,  Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016; Shenhav et al., 2012).  
Frederick (2005), in his original report on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), found that 
men outperformed women, and gender differences in the CRT have been confirmed in several 
subsequent studies with participants from different age groups, educational levels, and countries, 
and using the original CRT as well as modified versions of the original test. These results are 
surprising, because Frederick (2005, p.26) described the CRT as a measure of “one type of 
cognitive ability”.  Given that gender differences in cognitive abilities are not commonly found, 
these results raise the important question of whether the CRT measures the same trait in men and 
women (i.e., whether it is an appropriate measure of reflectivity in the case of both genders). In case 
the underlying trait measured by the test is the same for both genders, an additional question is 
whether the gender difference can be explained by any particular cognitive or affective factor that is 
related to performance on the CRT. The aim of the current paper was to address these questions. 
Studies with adults (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Cueva et. al., 2016; Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016) found that males scored higher on the CRT than females, and females 
gave more intuitive responses than males, while no gender differences emerged for other types of 
incorrect answers that did not correspond to the typical intuitive response. Campitelli and Gerrans 
(2014) also showed that women struggled with inhibiting the intuitive response, especially in the 
case of the “bat and ball” problem. An analogous relation between gender and performance on the 
original CRT was found by Sinayev and Peters (2015) with American adults, by Ring, Neyse, 
David-Barett and Schmidt (2016), who tested German undergraduate students, and by Albaity, 
Rahman and Shahidul (2014) whose study involved Malaysian adults from different ethnic groups.  
Gender differences were also found in the case of extended versions of the CRT. In a study 
conducted by Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014) with Canadian university students, male students 
obtained higher scores than female students, not only on the original CRT, but also on four new 
items. Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati and Hamilton (2016) confirmed that males outperformed 
females on the original CRT, and also observed a gender difference in the case of a long form of the 
CRT (CRT-L), which included three new items. Their results were obtained with Italian and British 
students, attending the senior year of high school and undergraduate university courses.  In sum, the 
studies that investigated gender differences on the CRT have found that males perform better than 
females on every single question, and that females are more likely to answer none of the questions 
correctly (i.e., they are more likely to show very low levels of cognitive reflection), while males are 
more likely to answer all three questions correctly (i.e., to exhibit very high levels of cognitive 
reflection). Importantly, gender differences persist even when controlling for test characteristics 
(e.g., monetary incentives, computerized administration, student samples, and positioning of the 
experiment; see Brañas-Garza, Kujal & Lenkei, 2015, for a review of 118 cognitive reflection test 
studies).  
In order to obtain an estimate of the effect size of gender differences in cognitive reflection, 
we have performed a meta-analysis of studies conducted by our research group in recent years 
(Morsanyi, Primi, Handley, Chiesi & Galli, 2012; Morsanyi et al., 2014; Morsanyi, McCormack & 
O’Mahony, 2017; Primi et al., 2016).1 Although in some of these studies we used the CRT-Long, 
we have only considered performance on the original CRT items, so that we could combine scores 
from a larger number of studies.2 The meta-analysis included data from 2,536 participants (1,611 
females) from 13 samples. Most participants were undergraduate students from the UK and Italy. 
Some studies also included adolescent participants, and in one study a multiple-choice version of 
the CRT was administered. These details are listed in Figure 1. The analysis was conducted using 
the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software using a random-effects model (i.e., we assumed that the 
true effect size of gender differences might vary from study to study). Specifically, we expected that 
there might be a variation due to the heterogeneity of our samples in terms of age and level of 
education. The summary effect for the meta-analysis appears in the last row of Figure 1.3 The point 
estimate was .53 (SE=.10, lower limit =.34, upper limit = .72), which corresponds to a medium 
effect size for gender differences in cognitive reflection.  
Even though gender differences in the CRT appear across multiple studies, only a few studies 
have examined the source of the gender gap in performance. As the CRT items have mathematical 
content, several studies have investigated the relationship between cognitive reflection and 
mathematical ability. Research has shown that people who perform well on the CRT tend to 
perform well on numeracy tests. Specifically, significant, moderate correlations have been found 
between performance on the CRT and mathematical ability, as indexed by numeracy, math 
achievement, or math skills (r=.25, Gómez-Chacón, García-Madruga, Vila, Elosúa, & Rodríguez, 
2014; r=.31, Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Primi et al., 2016; rs ranging from .37 to .51, Liberali et al., 
                                                          
1 This analysis was specifically conducted for the purposes of the current paper, and has not been 
previously reported elsewhere. We have also included the data from the current paper in this 
analysis. 
2 In studies where we used the CRT-Long, the original items were administered before the new 
items. For this reason, performance on the original CRT items was not affected by the inclusion of 
the new items. 
3 Under the random-effects model, there is a distribution of true effects, and the summary effect is 
an estimate of the mean of this distribution. 
2012; r=.43, Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Weller, Dieckmann, Tusler, Mertz, Burns, & Peters, 
2013; r=.44 with numeracy and r=.61 with calculation, Sinayev & Peters, 2015; rs ranging from .29 
to .45, Morsanyi, Busdraghi, & Primi, 2014; r=.53, Finucane & Gullion, 2010; r=.58, Thomson & 
Oppenheimer, 2016).  
Some authors suggested that the numerical content of the CRT items might be responsible for 
the gender differences. For instance, Primi et al. (2016) found that the gender difference in the 
CRT-L was significantly reduced after the effects of numeracy were controlled, and they became 
non-significant when the effect of subjective numeracy was controlled. Zhang et al. (2016) verified 
that gender differences could be entirely explained by differences in subjective numeracy, that is,  
individuals’ perceived competence in dealing with quantitative information, (in other words, their 
self-efficacy in the quantitative domain). Consistent with these findings, Thomson and 
Oppenheimer (2016) found that men outperformed females in the original CRT, but they did not 
find a gender difference in their newly developed four items that did not require any numerical 
computations (although they did involve numbers).   
  Starting from the premise that the CRT has a significant math component, the aim of the 
current study was to investigate the possibility that gender differences were related to the numerical 
content of the problems. Indeed, several studies have reported gender differences in math ability 
(e.g., Benbow, Lubinski, Shea, & Eftekhari-Sanjani, 2000; Hyde, Fennema & Lamon, 1990; Mau 
& Lynn, 2000), showing that males outperformed females.  Probably the strongest evidence for the 
existence of gender differences in mathematics performance comes from the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2016), which assesses the competencies of 15-year-old students from 65 different countries in 
various subjects, including mathematics. On average, across the OECD countries, boys outperform girls in 
mathematics by eight score points4. Between the PISA 2012 and PISA 2015 assessments, the gender gap did 
not change significantly in the vast majority of countries. Nevertheless, both the existence and the 
                                                          
4 The same report also shows a relatively large gender gap in reading in favour of girls, and negligible gender 
differences in science performance. 
nature of gender differences have been questioned. For example, Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis and 
Williams (2008), using data from over 7 million students, found no evidence of gender differences 
on US state math tests among students between grade 2 and grade 11. 
Cognitive reflection has not only been found to be related to math skills, but also to the self-
assessment of feelings and perceptions concerning one’s ability to reason about and solve 
mathematical tasks. For instance, performance on the CRT was found to be significantly and 
positively related to participants’ subjective perception of their quantitative abilities (r=.19, Primi et 
al., 2016; r=.39, Zhang et al., 2016; ranging from .43 to .48, Liberali et al., 2012), and it was 
significantly and negatively related to math anxiety (MA) (r=-.20, Morsanyi et al., 2014). MA has 
also been investigated across PISA countries in the 2012 survey. The results showed that around 
30% of students reported feeling helpless or nervous when faced with math problems, and negative 
feelings toward math are also associated with lower school performance. Special attention has been 
paid to math anxiety (MA) and its impact on mathematical learning: an ever-growing body of 
research has recognized that anxiety states and worry experienced during math classes or related 
activities are significant factors with a negative influence on math learning and basic numerical 
abilities in both adults (Bursal & Paznokas, 2006; Jameson & Fusco, 2014; Pozehl, 1996; Maloney 
& Beilock, 2012; McMullan, Jones, & Lea, 2010; Swars, Daane, & Giesen, 2006) and children 
(Hill, et al., 2016; Wu, Barth, Amin, Malcarne, & Menon, 2012). MA thus seems to have serious 
consequences, not only in the short term (on math performance at school), but also in the long term, 
adversely influencing an individual’s choice of career, type of occupation, and professional growth 
in adulthood (Ashcraft & Ridley, 2005; Beasley, Long & Natali, 2001; Chimman, Krantz, & Silver, 
1992; Hembree, 1990; Ho et al., 2000).  Concerning gender differences, the findings generally 
suggest that females suffer from MA more than males (see Else-Quest, Hyde & Linn, 2010; and see 
Devine, Fawcett, Szucs, & Dowker, 2012, for a short review), and that women are consequently 
less likely to seek opportunities for math problem solving, and they tend to avoid math-related 
activities (Baloğlu & Kocak, 2006; Else-Quest et al., 2010; Jain & Dowson, 2009; McGraw, 
Lubienski, & Strutchens, 2006; Rubinsten, Bialik, & Solar, 2012). 
Starting from these previous studies, we wanted to investigate more thoroughly the origin of 
the gender differences in cognitive reflection. Nevertheless, before delving into this issue, it is 
necessary to check the measurement invariance of cognitive reflection across genders. If a test is not 
invariant (i.e., if it does not measure the same construct in the same way in different groups of 
respondents), the comparison of test scores between different groups of individuals has to be 
considered invalid (Waiyavutti, Johnson, & Deary, 2012). 
To the best of our knowledge, so far the invariance of the cognitive reflection test across 
genders has never been tested. That is, it is not clear if the items of the test are suitable to measure 
the construct (cognitive reflection) in males as well as females. The analysis of Differential Item 
Functioning is central to the investigation of the measurement equivalence of a scale at the item 
level (i.e., DIF allows one to assess whether the items measure the same trait dimension when 
administered to two different groups). Thus, it is necessaryto verify that the structure of the test, and 
item functioning is the same amongst male and female samples, in order to ascertain that the 
documented gender differences are due to real differences among males and females and not the 
result of biases in item functioning.  
In sum, the aim of Study 1 was to provide evidence of the gender invariance of the Cognitive 
Reflection Test – Long (CRT-L), a new version of the CRT, which was recently developed in order 
to obtain a valid and reliable instrument, which overcomes some of the limitations of the original 
three-item CRT (Primi et al., 2016). If the CRT-L is invariant across genders, observed scores 
depend only on the levels of the latent construct, and not on group membership, and observed 
differences between groups reflect true differences in the amount or variability of the construct. 
With these premises, Study 2 sought to investigate the possibility that gender differences were 
related to the numerical content of the problems. In particular, we tested the hypothesis that math 
skills and math anxiety explained gender differences in cognitive reflection.  
Study 1 
When comparing groups, researchers assume that the instrument (questionnaire, ability test) 
that they employ measures the same construct in all groups. Despite its appeal and its practical 
significance, this assumption is often not justified and needs to be tested. If the test does not 
measure the same construct across different groups, results are not comparable and inferences about 
group differences are misleading. The general term used to describe the lack of correspondence 
between measures applied to different groups is bias (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1997). 
Measurement equivalence might be threatened by different forms of bias. Item bias refers to 
differences in item-level responses that occur when items function differently for certain groups of 
respondents. For example, items are biased when their content is not equally familiar to all groups. 
Item bias violates the assumption of measurement invariance, which holds that measurement 
properties should not be affected by the content of the test (Zumbo, 2009).  
Regarding the Cognitive Reflection Test, several studies have measured and compared 
differences across genders, assuming the invariance of the test, although it has never been 
empirically tested. The aim of Study 1 was to test the equivalence of the CRT-L items across 
genders by exploring Differential Item Functioning (DIF) within the Item Response Theory (IRT) 
framework. The aim of the DIF analysis is to ascertain that, after controlling for the underlying 
construct, the response to an item is related to group membership. If so, the item manifests DIF. For 
example, if the CRT-L exhibits measurement invariance across genders, a randomly selected 
woman with a specific level of cognitive reflection and a randomly selected man with the same 
level of cognitive reflection should have the same chance of giving the correct answer to an item. If 
this is not the case, DIF is present. In sum, the aim of the current study was to test the invariance 
property of the CRT-L across genders.  
 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 838 students (52% female; Mean age = 15.3 years; SD = 4.03; 55% from 
secondary school; Mean age = 12.55 years; SD = .71; 20% from high school Mean age = 16.27 
years; SD = 1.5 and 25% attending university; Mean age = 21.12 years; SD = 3.5). The adolescents 
were recruited from secondary and high schools in a suburban area in Italy (Tuscany). A detailed 
study protocol that explained the goals and methodology of the study was approved by the 
institutional review boards of each school. Students received an information sheet, which assured 
them that the data obtained would be handled confidentially and anonymously. All university 
students were enrolled in the first year of a psychology course at the University of Florence, and 
were recruited using opportunity sampling from various lectures and seminars. All students 
participated on a voluntary basis. 
In the gender DIF analyses, the male group included 403 students (Mean age = 15.03, SD= 3.8; 
range = 11.08 to 42), and the female group 435 students (Mean age = 15.7, SD= 4.2; range = 11.08 
to 45)5.  
 
Materials 
The Cognitive Reflection Test-Long (CRT-L, Primi et al., 2016) is an extended version of the CRT 
(Frederick, 2015) that consists of 6 questions. Although the questions are open-ended, almost all 
participants produce either the correct response or a typical incorrect (i.e., heuristic) response. That 
is, the reasoning errors that people make are very systematic. An example item is the following:  ‘If 
three elves can wrap three toys in one hour, how many elves are needed to wrap six toys in two 
hours? [correct answer = 3 elves; heuristic answer = 6 elves]. To be able to produce a correct 
response, participants have to display an outstanding ability to effectively monitor and correct their 
impulsive response tendencies. As a result, it is only a small minority of participants who tend to 
                                                          
5 In the female group the age range was wider than in the male group due to a single participant who was 45 years old. 
Comparing the means, the difference was significant with a small effect size (t (829) = 2.449, p<.05, d = 0.17). 
give correct responses to the tasks. Previous results (Primi et al., 2016) attested that the CRT-L 
scale is more adequate for younger and less educated samples than the original CRT.  Cronbach’s 
alpha6 in the current study was .80.  
 
Procedure 
All students completed the test individually in a self-administered format in the classroom. The task 
was briefly introduced, and instructions for completion were given. The answers were collected in a 
paper-and-pencil format. Students were instructed to take as much time as they needed to complete 
the task. The average administration time was about 5 minutes. 
 
Data Analysis 
Preliminarily, we verified the assumption of unidimensionality in each group. In the current 
study, using the χ2LD statistic (Chen & Thissen, 1997) we tested the presence of local dependence 
(LD), i.e., an excess of covariation among item responses that is not accounted for by a 
unidimensional IRT model. Values of 10 or greater suggest the presence of a multifactorial 
structure. Otherwise, it is possible to assume that there is a common factor underlying the items.The 
fit of the IRT model was evaluated using the M2 statistic and the associated root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA) value. Like other chi-square statistics, the M2 statistic is generally 
unrealistic because there will be some error in any strong parametric model (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993). Thus, the RMSEA provides a more appropriate metric for model error (Cai, 
Maydeu‐Olivares, Coffman, & Thissen, 2006). RMSEA values of 0.05 or lower indicate good fit. 
Item parameters were estimated by employing the marginal maximum likelihood estimation method 
with the expectation–maximization algorithm (Bock, & Aitkin,1981) implemented in IRTPRO (Cai, 
du Toit, & Thissen, , 2011)., and the item fit under the 2PL model was tested computing the S-χ2 
statistics (Orlando & Thissen, 2000). As large samples lead to a greater likelihood of significant 
                                                          
6 Reliability was .82 for males, and .76 for females. 
chi-square differences, the critical value of p=.01, rather than p=.05, was used (Stone & Zhang, 
2003).IRT models assume that each examinee responding to a test item possesses some amount of 
the underlying ability and at each level of ability there will be a certain probability, denoted by P 
(), to give a correct answer to the item. This approach derives the probability of each response as a 
function of the latent trait and some item parameters. In the 2PL model the two item parameters are, 
respectively, item difficulty and item discrimination. The item difficulty parameter (β) or “location” 
measured on the same scale of theta (that conventionally has a mean of zero and SD of 1.0), 
represents the latent trait level corresponding to a .50 probability of correctly endorsing the item  
The item discrimination parameter (α) or “slope” represents the item’s ability to differentiate 
between people at contiguous levels of the latent trait. This parameter describes how rapidly the 
probabilities change with trait levels. In order to investigate the invariance property of the items of 
the scale, analyses of differential item functioning (DIF) across genders were performed, applying 
an IRT likelihood ratio test approach implemented in the IRTPRO software (Cai, Thissen, & du 
Toit, 2011).  
The DIF detection procedure is based on a nested model comparison approach. For each 
item, two models are compared, one in which all parameters (discrimination and difficulty) are 
constrained to be equal across groups, and one with a separate estimation of all parameters. For 
each item, the fit of a model constraining the item parameters to be equal between the two groups 
was compared with a model allowing the parameters to be estimated freely in the two groups. This 
procedure involves comparing differences in log-likelihoods (distributed as chi-square) associated 
with nested models. Since multiple tests were performed, Bonferroni corrections were used.  
Results 
Differential Item Functioning (DIF) across gender  
The results confirmed that a single factor model adequately represented the structure of the 
scale for each group, as none of the LD statistics were greater than .10.  
The model showed a satisfactory fit (M2 =16.70, df =18, p= 0.54; RMSEA =0.0001). Each 
item had a non-significant S-χ2 value (Table 1), indicating that all items fit under the 2PL model. 
 Concerning the difficulty parameters (b), the results showed that the parameters ranged from 
-.33  .08 to .95  .11 logit in the male group and -.39  .06 to .87  .15 logit in the female group 
across the continuum of the latent trait. With regard to the discrimination parameters (a), according 
to Baker and Kim (2004), (values 0.01–0.24 are very low, 0.25–0.64 are low, 0.65–1.34 are 
moderate, 1.35–1.69 are high, and more than 1.7 are very high) all items showed high 
discrimination levels (a values over .1.35) in each group (Table 1).  
 In the DIF analyses (in which the male group was the reference group), we found gender 
equivalence for both the discrimination (a) and the difficulty (b) parameters, after Bonferroni 
corrections (p= .05/ 6 = .008) (Table 1). 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Discussion 
The results attested the measurement equivalence of the scale when administered to male and 
female students. In other words, the same underlying construct is measured in the two groups. This 
ensures that the CRT-L can be used to compare males and females, and differences in scores across 
genders can be interpreted in terms of group differences in the level of the underlying construct.   
 
 
 
Study 2 
As we described above, Zhang et al. (2016) found that gender differences in cognitive 
reflection are explained by subjective numeracy.  Nevertheless, it is problematic to interpret this 
result, because the subjective numeracy scale combines the measurement of participants’ self-
reported ability and their preference to work with numbers (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, 
Jankovic, Derry & Smith, 2007). Indeed, it is not clear if subjective numeracy should be considered 
a measure of numeracy, or if it is more closely related to motivation, emotions, and confidence 
involving the use of numbers (cf., Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein & Pardo, 2012; Peters & 
Bjalkebring, 2015). Thus, for a better understanding, it would be desirable to measure numeracy 
and math-related emotions and attitudes separately. 
Regarding the role of cognitive and affective factors in cognitive reflection, Morsanyi et al. 
(2014) confirmed that both numerical skills and math anxiety independently predicted performance 
on the CRT. Specifically, they presented a model, where numeracy/school math achievement 
partially mediated the effect of math anxiety on cognitive reflection (after the effect of test anxiety 
was controlled). This model was tested both in a sample of female university students, and in a 
sample of secondary school students. In the secondary school sample, gender was also included in 
the model as a covariate, and its effect on cognitive reflection was found to be non-significant. That 
is, gender did not explain additional variance in cognitive reflection, once the effects of math 
anxiety and math achievement were taken into account. Nevertheless, there was no gender 
difference in cognitive reflection in this study, and Morsanyi et al. (2014) did not investigate 
whether the effect of gender on CRT performance was mediated by math skills, math anxiety or 
both. Thus, the current study sought to replicate the earlier findings regarding the role of math 
knowledge and math anxiety in cognitive reflection, and additionally test the hypothesis that math 
knowledge and math anxiety might mediate the effect of gender on cognitive reflection.  
Additionally, instead of basic measures of numeracy, which are typically used in studies that 
explore the links between numerical skills and performance on the CRT, in the current study, we 
measured more complex mathematical reasoning skills. In order to assess mathematical reasoning 
abilities comprehensively, we used a combined score of two measures: a measure of probabilistic 
reasoning skills (including the understanding of basic probabilities presented in text and tables, 
reasoning about random sequences of events, and the ability to resist some typical fallacies and 
biases) and a measure which was developed to assess statistical literacy. Both measures require the 
application of mathematical/probabilistic reasoning in the context of everyday scenarios. However, 
the first measure was developed to identify people who struggle with basic probabilistic reasoning, 
whereas the latter measure is aimed at discriminating between individuals with high levels of 
statistical reasoning ability. As a result of combining the two scales, we obtained a measure that 
included items ranging from relatively easy to very difficult, ensuring that participants’ 
mathematical reasoning skills were assessed with good precision.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 181 university students (Mean age = 21.23 years, SD = 3.67) 33% male 
(Mean age = 21.81 years, SD = 4.34) and 66% female (Mean age = 20.94 years, SD = 3.28)7  
enrolled in the first year of a psychology course at the University of Florence, and were recruited 
using opportunity sampling from various lectures and seminars. All students participated on a 
voluntary basis.  
 
Materials 
Cognitive reflection was measured by the Italian version of the CRT-L (Primi et al., 2016) as in 
Study 1. In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .76.  
 
Measure of math anxiety. The Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale (AMAS; Hopko, Mahadevan,, Bare 
& Hunt, 2003; Italian version: Primi, Busdraghi, Tomasetto, Morsanyi, & Chiesi, 2014) measures 
math anxiety experienced by students in learning and test situations (e.g., “Thinking about an 
upcoming math test one day before.”). Participants have to respond on the basis of how anxious 
they would feel during the events specified, using a 5-point response scale (ranging from “strongly 
                                                          
7 There was no age difference across genders (p=.141). 
agree” to “strongly disagree”). High scores on the scale indicate high math anxiety. A single 
composite score was obtained, based on participants’ ratings of each statement. In the present 
sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .89.  
 
Measures of mathematical reasoning. The Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT, Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, 
Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012) has been developed specifically for educated and highly 
educated samples (e.g., college students), is composed of 4 questions (with an open-ended question 
format), and it assesses statistical numeracy and risk literacy. In detail, the contents of the items are 
about risks, presented in terms of ratio concepts, such as probabilities, proportions, and percentages. 
(for example “Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 
members in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. 
What is the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? Please indicate the 
probability in percent______ % ). A single composite score was computed based on the sum of 
correct responses.  In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .50. 
 
The Probabilistic Reasoning Scale (PRS, Primi, Morsanyi, Donati, Galli & Chiesi, 2017) has been 
designed to measure proportional reasoning and basic probabilistic reasoning skills. The scale 
consists of 16 multiple-choice questions. The items include questions about simple, conditional, and 
conjunct probabilities, and the numerical data are presented in frequencies or percentages (for 
example: “A ball was drawn from a bag containing 10 red, 30 white, 20 blue, and 15 yellow balls. 
What is the probability that it is neither red nor blue?” a) 30/75; b) 10/75; c) 45/75; and “60% of the 
population in a city are men and 40% are women. 50% of the men and 30% of the women smoke. 
We select a person from the city at random. What is the probability that this person is a smoker? “ 
a) 42%, b) 50%, c) 85%) A single composite score was computed based on the sum of correct 
responses. Coefficient alpha for the current sample was .72. 
We obtained a measure of mathematical reasoning summing the transformed z scores of the BNT 
and PRS tests. This way, we obtained a measure with a broad range of item difficulty: from easy to 
very difficult. The reliability of the combined measure was .69.  
Procedure 
All students completed the measures individually in a self-administered format in the classroom. 
Each task was briefly introduced, and instructions for completion were given. The answers were 
collected in a paper-and-pencil format. All measures (the AMAS, PRS, BNT, and CRT-L) were 
administered in a booklet in a randomized order. There was about half an hour to complete the 
scales. 
 Data analysis 
To investigate our hypothesis about the relationships between mathematical reasoning, math 
anxiety, gender and cognitive reflection, we computed Pearson correlations among these variables. 
To further enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the relationships among these 
variables, a mediation model was tested. To test our mediation hypothesis concerning the 
relationship between gender and cognitive reflection through math anxiety and mathematical 
reasoning, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS, which allowed us to test a multiple-step 
multiple mediator model (Hayes, 2009). In this model (Figure 1), path a1 and path a2 are, 
respectively, the regression coefficients estimating math anxiety and mathematical reasoning from 
gender, and path b1 and path b2 are the regression coefficients estimating cognitive reflection from 
math anxiety and mathematical reasoning, respectively. Path a3 is the regression coefficient 
estimating mathematical reasoning from math anxiety. In this model, three specific indirect effects 
of gender on cognitive reflection can be quantified, i.e., the product of a1  b1 , which assesses the 
indirect effect through math anxiety, and the product of a2  b2, that measures the indirect effect 
through mathematical reasoning, and the product of a1  a3  b2, which indicates the indirect effect 
through math anxiety and mathematical reasoning in serial (Figure 1). The sum of the three specific 
indirect effects corresponds to the total indirect effect (see Brown, 1997). 
A bootstrapping procedure (with 10,000 resamples) to estimate 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals (BC 95% CI) was used. A BC 95 % CI that does not include zero provides 
evidence of a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Bootstrapping is a resampling 
strategy for estimation and hypothesis testing. With the bootstrapping method, the sample is 
conceptualized as a pseudo-population that represents the broader population from which the 
sample was derived, and the sampling distribution of any statistic can be generated by calculating 
the statistic of interest in multiple resamples from the dataset. The bootstrapping procedure has been 
suggested as representing the most trustworthy test for assessing the effects of mediation models, 
overcoming issues associated with inaccurate p-values that result from violations of parametric 
assumptions (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013). Indeed, the bootstrapping procedure is advantageous 
because it does not impose the assumption of normality of the sampling distribution of indirect 
effects, and it maintains high power while maintaining adequate control over Type I error rate 
(Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets, 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood & 
Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Results 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the CRT-L and the 
other measures. As expected, the CRT-L was negatively related to math anxiety and positively 
related to the BNT and the PRS. The CRT also showed a negative relation with gender: females 
scored lower on the CRT. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
To explore the role of math reasoning skills and math anxiety in the gender gap in CRT-L 
performance, a mediation analysis was conducted with the bootstrapping method with bias-
corrected confidence estimates. Results showed that whereas the total effect of gender on cognitive 
reflection was significant (p<.001), once the mediators were entered into the analysis, the direct 
effect of gender was no longer significant (p=.245). However, a significant total indirect effect of 
gender on cognitive reflection was found (point estimate = -0.980, BC 95%CI = -1.363 to -.638). In 
detail, the results showed a significant indirect effect of gender on cognitive reflection through math 
anxiety (point estimate = -0.149, BC 95%CI = -.343 to -.025) and mathematical reasoning (point 
estimate = -0.068, BC 95%CI = -.177 to -.013), and through math anxiety and mathematical 
reasoning in serial (point estimate = -0.763, BC 95%CI = -1.121 to -.479).  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Discussion 
The results confirmed that, in line with several previous studies (e.g., Campitelli & Gerrans, 
2014; Cueva et. al. 2016; Frederick, 2005; Pennycook et al., 2016; Primi et al., 2016), gender was 
related to performance on the CRT (i.e., men scored significantly higher than women). However, 
the gender differences disappeared when numerical skills and math-related anxiety were statistically 
controlled. Although the CRT is more than just a test of numeracy (e.g., Campitelli & Gerrans, 
2014; Liberali et al., 2012), these results suggest that the numerical content of the problems acts as a 
confounding variable. 
 Regarding the role of math anxiety in cognitive reflection, a previous study (Morsanyi et al. 
2014) showed that highly math anxious individuals responded more quickly (and less accurately) to 
CRT-problems than participants with low levels of anxiety. This might be interpreted as a strategy 
to avoid the uncomfortable situation of having to solve numerical problems (see e.g., Ashcraft & 
Krause, 2007). This tendency might explain why math anxious people are more likely to give 
incorrect heuristic responses. In other words, the desire to finish the “math task” as soon as possible 
might prevent them from engaging in more in-depth reasoning and reflection, which is necessary to 
reach the correct solution. Additionally, previous studies (see Suárez-Pellicioni, Núñez-Peña & 
Colomé, 2016 for a review) have shown attentional control problems in high math anxious 
individuals, especially in inhibitory tasks (Stroop tasks), which could also explain the tendency to 
rely on salient heuristics. Indeed, several authors have noted that inhibition of the easily available 
heuristic response is necessary for correct performance on the cognitive reflection test (e.g., 
Böckenholt, 2012; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Travers et al., 2016).  Morsanyi et al. (2014) also 
explored the possibility that math anxiety affected performance on the CRT through burdening 
working memory resources. Although both anxiety and working memory load were associated with 
poorer performance on the CRT, only anxiety (but not working memory load) was associated with 
faster RTs and lower levels of confidence in responses. For this reason, it was concluded that the 
effects of anxiety and working memory load were only partially overlapping.  
Previous studies have provided evidence for the role of both numeracy and math 
anxiety/math-related attitudes in performance on the CRT. Some studies have also linked these 
findings to gender differences in cognitive reflection (Morsanyi et al., 2014; Primi et al., 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2016). Nevertheless, these studies did not investigate whether the effect of gender on 
CRT performance was mediated by math skills, math anxiety or both.  Additionally, the mediation 
analysis that was run in the current study also provided some novel information regarding the roles 
of math reasoning skills and math anxiety. In particular, this model showed that there was a direct 
link between math anxiety and cognitive reflection but the effect of math anxiety on cognitive 
reflection was also partially mediated by mathematical reasoning.  In sum, the mathematics 
requirements of the CRT explained gender differences in cognitive reflection – a supposedly 
domain-general trait-, and when these factors were controlled, men and women did not differ in 
their level of cognitive reflection. This finding is in line with Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) 
who did not find a gender difference in the case of their new version of the CRT (CRT-2), a test that 
did not require numerical computations.    
Ideally, reflectivity should be measured independent of numerical skills and anxiety.  
Nevertheless, it is not clear if a non-numerical test of cognitive reflection would still be as closely 
related to decision-making skills as the original CRT or the CRT-L. For example, in Thomson and 
Oppenheimer’s (2016) study, the correlations between the CRT-2 and various measures of decision-
making skills and rational thinking were generally weaker than the correlations between these 
measures and the original CRT. Indeed, most heuristics and biases tasks and a large proportion of 
the commonly used decision making competence measures (e.g., the tasks measuring framing 
effects, the consideration of sample sizes, base rates, intertemporal preferences, risk seeking, etc.) 
include numerical information. It is also true that many important real-life decisions (including 
decisions about financial investments, health insurance, pension schemes and medical treatments) 
require a good level of statistical literacy. 
Conclusion 
Study 1 attested the measurement equivalence of the CRT-L when administered to male and 
female participants. Thus, the observed gender differences in cognitive reflection are actual 
differences and they do not reflect a bias in the measurement process. Although the test measures 
the same construct in both males and females, the results of Study 2 suggest that numerical skills 
and math-related feelings, such as math anxiety, are strongly correlated with performance on the 
CRT.  Given that men often outperform women on math reasoning tasks and they show less 
anxiety, this finding is problematic for studies that seek to measure reflectivity independently of 
quantitative skills.  One solution to this problem could be to measure cognitive reflection 
independent of math skills (e.g., Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). Nevertheless, this line of work 
needs further validation, and it would also be advantageous to develop additional tasks for this 
purpose, which cover a broader range of difficulty levels. Another possible solution to this issue 
could be to use math skills as a covariate when looking at the relations between the CRT and other 
measures in order to be able to distinguish between the effects of reflection and numeracy. 
Nevertheless, in this case, the results would strongly depend on the choice of numeracy measure. 
Future studies should aim to explore further the role of reflectivity and numerical skills in 
distinguishing between competent and incompetent decision makers. Additionally, these studies 
could also confirm whether gender differences disappear when reflectivity is measured 
independently of quantitative skills. 
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Table 1. 
Fit statistics, parameters for each item of the CRT-L for gender groups, and DIF analysis of 
discrimination and difficulty parameters across genders. 
Note. S-χ2 statistics, df = degrees of freedom, (Degrees of freedom are equal to the difference 
between the number of theta levels and the number of the model parameters). Depending on the 
sample characteristics, the number of theta levels might change from one item to the other because 
the number of cases for each theta level might be too small for some items. If this happens, some 
consecutive levels are collapsed in order to reach an adequate number of cases for all the levels, 
which allows more stable estimates).; parameters: a = discrimination, b = difficulty., SE = standard 
error, DIF = Differential Item Functioning (Due to the large sample size  was fixed at .01). 
 Males Females a DIF b DIF 
Item 
S-χ2 
(df) 
p 
a 
(SE) 
b 
(SE) 
S-χ2 
(df) 
p 
a 
(SE) 
b 
(SE) 
χ² df p χ² df p 
1 
.99 
(4) 
.912 
2.38 
(.37) 
.70 
(.09) 
.94 
(4) 
.919 
2.29 
(.37) 
.71 
(.10) 
0.0 1 .87 0.0 1 .97 
2 
6.13 
(4) 
.189 
1.99 
(.29) 
.59 
(.10) 
6.05 
(4) 
.195 
3.98 
(.80) 
.48 
(.06) 
5.5 1 .02 0.1 1 .80 
3 
.69 
(4) 
.952 
3.47 
(.64) 
.34 
(.07) 
3.93 
(4) 
.417 
3.32 
(.57) 
.39 
(.06) 
0.0 1 .86 0.2 1 .63 
4 
6.95 
(2) 
.031 
3.41 
(.68) 
-.33 
(.08) 
.57 
(2) 
.751 
3.11 
(1.20) 
-.39 
(.06) 
0.1 1 .73 0.2 1 .66 
5 
1.73 
(4) 
.786 
2.40 
(.38) 
.95 
(.11) 
1.72 
(4) 
.787 
2.80 
(.50) 
.77 
(.09) 
0.4 1 .53 1.1 1 .29 
6 
.47 
(4) 
.978 
2.43 
(.37) 
.54 
(.08) 
1.73 
(4) 
.785 
1.49 
(.26) 
.87 
(.15) 
4.3 1 .04 1.8 1 .19 
Table 2. 
Correlations between the CRT-L, gender, the BNT, probabilistic reasoning ability and maths 
anxiety. 
 CRT-L BNT PRS Maths 
Reasoning 
AMAS Gender 
1 CRT-L       
2 BNT  .42***      
3 PRS .55*** .38***.     
4 Maths 
Reasoning 
.59*** .83*** :83*** 
 
  
4 AMAS -.39*** -.23** -.24** -.29***   
5 Gender -.33*** -.41*** -.32*** -.44*** .16*  
M 2.82 1.10 12.51 0 26.36  
SD 1.86 1.03 2.42 1 7.92  
Note. Males coded as 1; females coded as 2. CRT-L = Cognitive Reflection Test – Long, , BNT = 
Berlin Numeracy Test; PRS = Probabilistic Reasoning Scale, Maths Reasoning (the combined z 
scores of the BNS and PRS) AMAS = Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale.  
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p<.05 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Meta-analysis of gender differences in cognitive reflection based on studies conducted by 
our research group with British and Italian participants. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 2. Multiple-step multiple mediator model with gender as independent variable, math anxiety 
and mathematical reasoning as simultaneous mediators, and cognitive reflection as a dependent 
variable.  
NOTE: Path values represent unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. 
Dotted line (c) represents the total effect of gender on cognitive reflection, i.e., the effect prior to 
the inclusion of the mediating variables. The c’ value represents the direct effect of gender on 
cognitive reflection, i.e. the effect of gender on cognitive reflection after the mediators are included. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
 
